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September 27, 2005

Mr. Kevin Kennedy
Executive Director, State Elections Board
17 West Main Street, Suite 310
Madison, WI 53701-2973

Re: Letter dated September 16, 2005, regarding Status of Implementation of the Statewide Voter Registration System and SEB Press Release dated September 19, 2005

Dear Kevin:

This letter is in response to the above-referenced letter and press release. Accenture shares the State Elections Board's concerns with the status of the Wisconsin's Statewide Voter Registration System (SVRS) and we are working hard to address the aspects of SVRS that are our responsibility.

Unfortunately, there are inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the letter, press release and statements that have been made to the news media. These inconsistencies and inaccuracies require correction.

- Your press release included a quote *"If we can't test it, we can't pilot it, and if we can't pilot it, we can't send it out to the rest of the state to use."*
This statement is not accurate. It implies the state has been unable to test the software and that you are not proceeding with the Pilot. In fact, a number of important functional areas (see Attachment 1) have been tested and are working well enough that before the letter and news release were sent, the Steering Committee decided on September 15th to proceed with the Pilot using the current version of the application, which we demonstrated to the media yesterday.
- In the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel of September 17, the reporter quoted you as saying *"We've tested it, and it's not working."*
This statement is not accurate. We take the allegation that the system is "not working" very seriously and disagree strongly. In fact, the system is working and the Steering Committee decided to proceed with the Pilot using the current version of the application.
- Kyle Richmond was quoted in the Capitol Times as saying that the Dane County Clerk's Office and volunteer clerks, who have been testing the software, found errors that blocked testers from doing such basic tasks as setting up a poll book.
This statement is not accurate. Poll books have been successfully tested by the SEB testers and the application does in fact generate them.

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- Your letter stated that Accenture's *"current product and system test of the application using the Wisconsin configuration and data is a necessary and productive change, yet we are concerned that you did not take this approach earlier."*

This statement is not accurate. Accenture has been testing the application using the Wisconsin configuration throughout the system testing period, since June, and with Wisconsin converted data since mid-July.

- During the demonstration for the media yesterday, you stated several times that the delay in implementation was caused by the software not being ready and because it has too many errors or bugs.

These statements are not accurate. With 1850 jurisdictions, a three-tier (state, county and municipality) structure, and new "provider/replier" business processes being developed for the municipalities to learn and follow this project is complex. In addition close to 2,000 users will need to be trained in the application and almost 4,000 will need to be trained in the business processes. Over a thousand municipalities will need to manually convert and validate their voter data. To state that the software is the sole reason for the delay or to imply that the software is the sole reason why Wisconsin will not meet the January 1 HAVA deadline is overly simplistic and inaccurate.

Regarding our testing of the application, as you know, and as we communicated in our most recent Steering Committee meeting, we have moved our system test to Chicago, to be closer to our development team, and we are system testing concurrent with our AESM Support Team's regression test of their code drop. It is typical in the industry that software is developed and product tested, and then released to clients for their subsequent configuration and system testing. We employed this industry-standard practice for the July and August drops of the AESM package. In response to our shared concerns with the timetable in Wisconsin, we recently modified our approach to system test the Wisconsin-specific SVRS configuration of AESM at the same time and in the same location as the AESM product test in order to achieve efficiencies and get bugs fleshed out and fixed more quickly. We will continue this practice until we have reduced the backlog of System Investigation Requests (SIRs) associated with the AESM software.

There are many areas of the system that are functioning well, and which have been tested and confirmed to work by the SEB testers. We have included as an attachment to this letter a list of these areas. In addition, and most important, our testing has confirmed that the SVRS application meets the SVRS Release 1 business and technical requirements as identified in our contract.

During its September 15, 2005 meeting, the SVRS Steering Committee decided to move forward with a Pilot of voter registration areas of the application beginning with training September 26, 2005, and culminating in go-live in the Pilot counties the week of October 10, 2005. When you and I spoke on Monday, September 19, you confirmed that Accenture is doing all that you would expect of us in this situation and that the SEB indeed is moving forward with the Pilot as agreed using the current version of the software.

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We acknowledge that there have been more SIRs in AESM than either of us would like to see, however as you know SIRs are an expected and normal part of the software development process. Accenture is committed and continues to work diligently to correct the outstanding SIRs in the software and provide an application that meets our contractual requirements. As you and I have previously discussed, Accenture has and is taking specific actions at no additional cost to the state to address the SIRs identified, including increasing the number of resources on the project, increasing the efficiency of our testing efforts, and having senior executives independent of the project review our approach and processes and recommend changes.

As we reported to the Steering Committee, the application still has a number of SIRs outstanding from User Acceptance Testing (UAT) - we have included in Attachment 2 the SVRS system SIR statistics as of September 20, 2005. As your letter indicates, our most recent code drop was September 23, 2005. That code drop is expected to resolve all of the outstanding Severity 2 SIRs, approximately half of the outstanding Severity 3 SIRs, and 20% of the outstanding Severity 4 SIRs. Our testing confirms this and the current UAT is producing positive results.

SEB plans to move forward with the implementation of the remaining functions of SVRS in the Pilot municipalities with this code drop contingent upon it passing UAT. We have been testing this new code drop alongside our AESM Support Team in Chicago with Wisconsin specific configurations and data to help ensure the drop provided does indeed resolve the remaining Severity 2 SIRs. As you noted, the September 23rd code drop will still have Severity 3 and Severity 4 bugs outstanding. We also expect additional SIRs to be generated during the Pilot period, as many users will be exercising the system during this period. Our AESM Support team is actively working to fix all reported bugs within the AESM software.

In Conclusion

As you correctly point out, there are a number of elements required for a successful implementation of SVRS, and we share your concern for the timetable required to complete the project. This is a complex project. Accenture shares your concerns in these areas and has actively worked with SEB to tailor and configure our AESM application to handle these complexities. We have always been open and honest about the status of the software. Since April, we have also warned you, the project managers and the Steering Committee about the issues and risks in areas of the program outside Accenture's control.

It is unfortunate that your letter and recent media coverage did not mention these areas or current reports from municipalities that indicate the State may have close to double the number of users of the SVRS application than anticipated, and up to four times as many elections personnel who will need to be trained in the new business processes. This is a critical development which will lengthen the overall implementation timeframe, regardless of the status of the SVRS application, as it will increase the time required to complete both business process and application training for all users.

Like you, we are committed to working together to address all these challenges in a straightforward and cooperative manner. We remain committed to the project and hope that we can impress on you and the SEB the level and seriousness of that commitment.


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To this end I will attend the Board Meeting on September 28, 2005, in Madison to respond to concerns raised by the Board. We look forward to implementing the VR Pilot over the next few weeks, and continuing our progress forward to completion of the SVRS.

Very truly yours,

ACCENTURE LLP

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Meg T. McLaughlin". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized "M" and "L".

By:
Meg T. McLaughlin

Cc: Carl Holborn
Robert Kasieta
Patrick J. Hodan
John C. Schober
Shane Falk
David Anstaett
Kirby Brant
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Attachment 1 - Software Functional Areas Ready for Implementation

- Voter Applications
- Voters
- Voter Matching
- Address Ranges
- Districts
- District Combinations
- Creating Elections (Election Wizard)
- Office Types
- Contests
- Candidate Filings
- Polling Places
- Link Polling Places to Wards
- Contacts
- Jurisdictions
- SVRS Release 1 Reports
- SVRS Release 1 Mailings

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Attachment 2 - Software System Investigation Request (SIR) as of September 20, 2005

The table below lists the System Investigation Request (SIR) levels and descriptions.

SIR Level	SIR Description
Level 1	SVRS is completely unavailable or severely impaired.
Level 2	SVRS has important functionality or core component which is unavailable or severely impaired. No mutually agreed upon work-around is available.
Level 3	SVRS has minor functionality which is unavailable or severely impaired. No mutually agreed upon work-around is available.
Level 4	Application is functioning with work-arounds. Incident may be prioritized as a Modification to be included in a future release. Any other uncategorized issues or questions.

The general criteria used to identify "Important" functionality is assessing if the functionality has major impact on the process of registering voters and administering an election. "Minor" functionality is that which, if impaired, does not prevent the SEB from registering voters and administering an election.

For the categorization of SIR Severity Levels, "severely impaired" means that the function or component has a discrepancy, error or other deficiency that stops application processing, corrupts data in the database, causes or enables a security breach, or provides incorrect data to the end user.

Testing to date has not uncovered any Severity 1 SIRs. As of 9/15/05, the application still has the following numbers of SIRs from User Acceptance Testing (UAT):

SIR Status By Severity:

	Open	Ready to Retest	Closed	Total
Level 1	0	0	0	0
Level 2	10	9	21	40
Level 3	60	7	34	101
Level 4	41	1	11	53
Total	111	17	66	194

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Attachment 2 - Software System Investigation Request (SIR) Statistics as of September 20, 2005

Example Open SVRS Application Software SIRs of each Severity:

Severity 2 -

- When processing a voter application, the system requires the user to fill in the ID check date and method. These will be filled in by the interface and should not be required fields.

Severity 3 -

- Users cannot set default fields and then use the defaults when processing a voter registration application.
- Users in the owner jurisdiction of an office position record cannot edit the associated office holder information.
- State level contests do not appear on an election when the election is inherited by a county.

Severity 4 -

- A misleading error message is displayed when saving a voter registration application with an invalid date.
- The Owner ID field is not displayed correctly in the Election Worker Recruit search results.
- The Election Grid does not allow elections records to be grouped or sorted.

Open Severity 2 SIRs by Functional Area and SIR Type:

	AESM Code	Configuration	Converted Date	Environment	Unknown	Local Code	System Usage	Total
General	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Voter Registration	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
Election Management	3	0	1	0	1	0	0	5
VR\EM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VPA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	7	0	1	0	2	0	0	9

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Open SIRs by Severity and SIR Type:

	AESM Code	Configuration	Converted Date	Environment	Unknown	Local Code	System Usage	Total
Level 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Level 2	8	3	1	2	2	2	1	19
Level 3	34	5	0	3	19	6	0	67
Level 4	32	1	0	0	9	0	0	42
Total	74	9	1	5	30	8	1	128

Of the Open SIRs, the 9/23 Code Drop is expected to resolve all the Severity 2 SIRs, 29 of the Severity 3 SIRs, and 8 of the Severity 4 SIRs.